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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON
FIREARMS REGULATION
The constitutional debate over firearms regulation is
centered on the requirements of the fifth and second
amendments to the United States Constitution. In discussing
the questions that will confront any federal regulatory schene,
this note examines recent fifth amendment decisions and
explores the origins of the second amendment, which has been
infrequently interpreted. It is concluded that while artfidly
drawn legislation could avoid the fifth amendment objections
posed by Haynes v. United States, the impact of the second
amendment is uncertain because of the historical and
decisional ambiguity surrounding that provision.
The National Firearms Act of 19341 and the Gun Control Act
ICh. 757, 48 Stat. 1236 (1934) (Jormerlr codified as 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801-62 (1964)). Prior
to its amendment in 1968 section 5811 of the Firearms Act placed a burdensomeFS200 tax on
the transfer or certain designated weapons, such as fully automatic firearms and sawed-off
shotguns and rifles, and a similar S200 tax on the making of such weapons by anyone other
than manufacturers was imposed by former section 5821. Exceptions for "making taxes"
were made in former section 5821(b)(2) if such a tax had previously been paid on the weapon
to be made, and if the weapon was made for, or transferred to, a peace officer, the United
States Government, a State, Territory, District of Columbia, or any political subdivision
thereof, both the "making" and "transfer" taxes were waived by former section 5821(b)(3).
In order to enforce this tax, persons possessing such weapons had to register them with the
Secretary of the Treasury under former section 5841. Exceptions were made for those
firearms in compliance with the applicable provisions of the Act. Id. In the case of the
"making" tax, former section 5821(e) required the registrant to file a "'notice of intent to
make" with the Secretary before he could lawfully commence construction of the firearm.
Importation of firearms, as defined by the Act, into the United States, was forbidden, unless
permission was granted by the Secretary or his delegate, under.former section 5845. In order
to receive such permission, the importer had to show that his purpose was lawful and that
the firearm was unique. td. Possession of any firearm in violation of the Act was unlawful,
as was failure to register the defined firearm, under former section 585 1.
Responding to an adverse holding by the Supreme Court in Haynes v. United States, 390
U.S. 85 (1968), with respect to the registration requirements of the Act, Congress completely
revised the statute, Pub. L. No. 90-6 18. § 201 (1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 1413-
24). antending 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5862, eliminating exceptions to the registration
requirements, id. (1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Naws at 1415-16) (26 U.S.C. § 5841), and
exempting from the transfer tax only transfers to federal, state and local governments and
their political subdivisions, and to registered manufacturers, dealers and importers. Id. (1968
U.S. COnE CO\G. & AD. N ws at 1420-21) (26 U.S.C. §§ 5851-53). The amended statute
further provides that the information obtained through compliance with the requirements of
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of 19682 presently comprise the major federal gun control
legislation. The Firearms Act is specifically directed at eliminating
the unlawful use of certain weapons such as machine guns and
the Act cannot be used either directly or indirectly as evidence against the registrant "in a
criminal proceeding with respect to a violation of law occurring prior to or concurrently with
the filing of the application or registration, or the compiling of the records containing the
information or evidence." Id. (1968 U.S. CODE Coxo. & AD. Naws at 1419-20) (26 U.S.C.
§ 5848). In addition, importations are further restricted, the "lawful and unique" standard
being abandoned. Under regulations by the Secretary of the Treasury, firearms, as defined,
may now be imported only for the purposes of scientific study or research, testing by a
registered manufacturer, use as a sample by a registered dealer or importer, or use by a
federal, state or local government. Id. (1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 1417) (26
U.S.C. § 5844). The amended Act also defines "destructive devices," such as mines,
grenades, and other explosives, for the purpose'of identification and regulation by the
Secretary. Id. (1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Nsws at 1418) (26 U.S.C. § 5845(f)). Finally,
the penalties for violation of the Act are increased: fines have been raised from a maximum of
S2,000 and/or five years' imprisonment to $10,000 and/or 10 years' imprisonment. Id. (1968
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. News at 1422) (26 U.S.C. § 5871).
- Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, §§ 101-302 (1968 U.S. CODE CONG.
AD. NEvs 1397-1424). This Act amended Title IV of the Omnibus Crime Control & Safe
Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 921-28 (Supp. 1968). which had
repealed the Federal Firearms Act of 1938, cli. 850, 52 Stat. 1250.
Requiring licenses for manufacturers, dealers and importers who desire to engage in the
interstate movement of firearms, Pub. L. No. 90-6 18, §§ 101-302 (1968 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1397, 1406-09) (18 U.S.C.A. § 923), the Gun Control Act prohibits interstate
sales or shipments to or reception by persons other than licensed manufacturers, dealers or
importers, id. (1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEvs at 1404-05) (18 U.S.C.A. §§ 922(d), (f)
& (h)). Certain exemptions are listed, such as sales or shipments to watchmen, law officers,
or others listed in 18 U.S.C. § 1715 (1964), Pub. L. No. 90-618, §§ 101-302 (1968 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 1401) (18 U.S.C.A. § 922(a)(2)(B)); shipments to lawful
owners by licensed manufacturers, dealers or importers who had received the firearms from
said owners; and shipments by owners to licensees for repairs or customizing, id. (1968 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 1400-01) (18 U.S.C.A. § 922(a)(2)(A)). Individuals are
forbidden to carry into their state of residency firearms purchased in another state, except
for sporting rifles and shotguns obtained in a state contiguous with the home state of the
purchaser, where the laws of the latter allow such importation, id. (1968 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws at 1401) (18 U.S.C.A. § 922(a)(3)). Exemption from the restrictions are: guns
received through bequest or intestate succession, id.; firearms acquired prior to the effective
date of the Act, id.; and firearms shipped to lawfully recognized sporting or shooting clubs,
and federal, state and local governments and their subdivisions, id. (1968 U.S. CODE Coxa.
& AD. Nepvs at 1402-03) (18 U.S.C.A. § 922(b)(3)). The seller may not knowingly, or with
reasonable cause to believe, make sales of rifles and shotguns to: minors under 18 and of any
other firearm to minors under 21, id. (1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 1402) (18
U.S.C.A. § 922(b)(1)); convicts or criminally accused persons, fugitives from the law, drug
addicts, and mental or former mental patients, id. (1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Naws at
1404) (18 U.S.C.A. § 922(d)); and persons to whom purchase or possession is forbidden by
the-law of the place of sale or delivery, id. (1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Naws at 1402)
(18 U.S.C.A. § 922(b)(2)). Inversely, interstate shipments or receptions by such persons are
also prohibited, id. (1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 1405) (18 U.S.C.A. § 922(h)).
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sawed-off shotguns, 3 whereas the 1968 Gun Control Act is more
comprehensive in its restrictions on mail order and interstate traffic
in. handguns, rifles and shotguns.4 Despite the rather extensive
Private, intrastate transactions, such as the gift of a pistol by a father to his son, would not,
per se, violate federal law. Unless otherwise prohibited by the Act, a licensee may sell to a
lawful customer, without a personal appearance by the latter, upon a submission by the
purchaser or a sworn statement stating that the transferee is not prohibited from purchasing
the firearm, and setting forth the name of the local law enforcement official to whom the
weapon will be delivered, id. (1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs at 1403-04) (18 U.S.C.A.
§ 922(c)). Notice to carriers of firearms shipments are required, id. (1968 U.S. CODE CoNG.
& AD. NEWS at 1404-05) (18 U.S.C.A. § 922(e)), and any carrier who knowingly, or with
reasonable cause to believe, transports firearms which contravene the prohibitions of the
statute, is in violation thereof, Id. (1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 1405) (18
U.S.C.A. § 922(f)). The Act also imposes heavy licensing fees, including S1,000 per year for
manufacturers, dealers and importers of destructive devices or ammunition therefor
(handguns are included, but sporting rifles and shotguns are not), id. (1968 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 1406-07) (18 U.S.C.A. § 923(a)). If destructive devices or their
ammunition are not involved, the fee is only 550 per year for firearms manufacturers and
importers, 510 per year for ammunition manufacturers, S25 per year for pawnbrokers, and
510 per year for dealers in such firearms who are not pawnbrokers. Id. Collectors of antique
firearms seeking licenses must pay S10 per year, id. (1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs
at 1407) (18 U.S.C.A. § 923(b)). A license must be-granted if the applicant is over 21, is not
prohibited from transporting, shipping or receiving such firearms, has not willfully failed to
disclose any required information, and has premises in the state from which he conducts
his business, id. (1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 1407) (18 U.S.C.A. § 923(d)(1)).
The Secretary is required to act upon the application within 45 days, and if he fails to do so,
the applicant may bring an action compelling the Secretary to act, id. (1968 U.S. CODE
CO.NcG. & AD. NEws at 1407) (18 U.S.C.A. § 923(d)(2)). Reasons for a denial must be
specified, and notice and an opportunity for a hearing are required prior to revocation of a
license, Id. (1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 1408) (18 U.S.C.A. § 923(0(1)).
Judicial review in a United States district court is also provided for, id. (1968 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws at 1408) (18 U.S.C.A. § 923(f)(3)). Licensees are required to keep
records of their transactions, and serial numbers are to be used to identify the firearms so
involved, id. (1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs at 1408-09) (18 U.S.C.A. §§ 923(g) &
(i)).
The penalties for violation of any provision of the Act are severe, with S5,000 and/or 5
years' imprisonment as the maximum, id. (1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs at 1409)
(18 U.S.C.A. § 924(a)). Persons who ship, transport or receive firearms in interstate
commerce with intent to commit an offense punishable by at least one year's imprisonment
face fines ranging to S10,000, and 10 years' incarceration, as do persons using firearms while
committing felonies, id. (1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs at 1409) (18 U.S.C.A.
§§ 924(b) & (c)).
Finally, the Act is not intended to pre-empt state law, except where there is an
irreconcilable conflict, nor is it intended to modify or affect the National Firearms Act of
1934, or 18 U.S.C. § 1715 (1964). relating to non-mailable firearms, Pub. L. No. 90-618,
§§ 101-302 (1968 U.S. CODE CO.G. & AD. NEws at 1412) (18 U.S.C.A. §§ 927 & 928).
= See note I supra.
'See note 2 supra.
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regulation of firearms under these and other less comprehensive
federal statutesa three-quarters of the American people apparently
18 U.S.C. § 1715 (1964). Firearms as Nonmailable; regulation. "Pistols, revolvers, and
other firearms capable of being concealed on the person are nonmailable and shall not be
deposited in or carried by the mails or delivered by any postmaster, letter carrier, or other
person in the Postal Service. Such articles may be conveyed in the mails, under such
regulations as the Postmaster General shall prescribe, for use in connection with their official
duty, to officers of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Coast Guard, Marine Corps, or Organized
Reserve Corps; to officers of the National Guard or Militia of a State, Territory, or District;
to officers of the United States or of a State, Territory, or District whose official duty is to
serve warrants of arrest or commitments; to employees of the Postal Service; to officers and
employees of enforcement agencies of the United States; and to watchmen engaged in
guarding the property of the United States, a State, Territory, or District. Such articles also
may be conveyed in the mails to manufacturers of firearms or bona fide dealers therein in
customary trade shipments, including such articles for repairs or replacement of parts, from
one to the other, under such regulations as the Postmaster General shall prescribe.
"'Whoever *knowingly deposits for mailing or delivery, or knowingly causes to be delivered
by mail according to the direction thereon, or at any place to which it is directed to be
delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any pistol, revolver, or firearm declared
nonmailable by this section, shall be fined not more than SI,000 or imprisoned not more
than two years, or both."
49 U.S.C. § 1472(I) (1964). Carrying weapons aboard aircraft. "lExcept for law
enforcement officers of any municipal or State government, or the Federal Government, who
are authorized or required to carry arms, and except for such other persons as may be so
authorized under regulations issued by the Administrator, whoever, while aboard an aircraft
being operated by an air carrier in air transportation, has on or about his person a concealed
deadly or dangerous weapon, or whoever attempts to board such an aircraft while having on
or about his person a concealed deadly or dangerous weapon, shall be fined not more than
S1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both."
49 U.S.C. § 1472(1) (1964). Carrying weapons aboard aircraft. "Except for law
enforcement officers of any municipal or State government, or the Federal Government. who
are authorized or required to carry arms, and except for such other persons as may be so
authorized under regulations issued by the Administrator, however, while aboard an aircraft
being operated by an air carrier in air transportation, has on or about his person a concealed
deadly or dangerous weapon, or whoever attempts to board such an aircraft while having on
or about his person a concealed deadly or dangerous weapon, shall be fined not more than
S1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both."
Federal Firearms Act of 1938, ch. 850, 52 Stat. 1250. Jornerly 15 U.S.C. §§ 901-10
(1964). which was repealed by Title IV of the Omnibus Crime Control & Safe Streets Act of
1968, 18 U.S.C.A. § 921-28, was designed to regulate the interstate and foreign commerce
of all firearms. Interstate shipment or reception by any person other than a licensed
manufacturer, importer or dealer, was forbidden. Unfortunately, the "dealer's fee" of SI
was so ridiculously low that any person wishing to receive firearms in compliance with the
federal law simply applied for a license. The Federal Firearms Act of 1938, generally, had
been ineffective in obtaining its purpose. See Hearings on S. Res. 240 Before the Subconn,.
to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Conlin. on the Judiciary 90th Cong.. 2d
Sess. 77 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Delinqueno Hearings] (remarks of Att'y Gen. Ramsey
Clark); Note, Firearms: Problems oJ Control, 80 HARy. L. REv. 1328. 1331 (1967):
Comment, Federal Regulation of Firearms Sales, 31 U. CHI. L. REv. 780, 787 (1964). But
see Note, Firearms Regulations, 17 W. REs. L. REv. 569, 572-73 (1965).
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desire additional federal legislation restricting private possession
and ownership of firearms!
Proponents of more restrictive gun laws believe that increased
measures are necessary to stem the rising rate of homicides which
involve firearms, 7 while opponents argue strenuously that additional
legislation is not the solution, and, indeed, may be
unconstitutionalY The constitutional arguments of the latter group
are usually based on the second amendment, which provides that
"the right to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed."
Moreover, firearms statutes which would require registration or
filing of specific information with the federal or state authorities
may transgress the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination!
The power of Congress to regulate firearms under the taxing
and commerce clause is clear. 0 The Supreme Court has upheld the
taxing provisions of the National Firearms Act"1 as a legitimate
exercise of the congressional power to tax' 2 Similarly, the lower
'A Harris Poll. taken April 22, 1968 revealed that 71' of all Americans favored strict
control over the sale or firearms. in response to the question: "Do you favor or oppose
Federal laws which would control the sales of guns, such as making all persons register all
gun purchases no matter where they buy them?" Twenty-three percent opposed such
regulation. Among firearms owners. the poll was 651 in favor, and 31c opposed. Quoted in
the REPORT OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY. ONNIBUS CRIME CONTROL AND
SAIl: STREErs ACT ot. 1968. S. REP. No.. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 198-99 (1968).
See generally C. BAKAL. THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARNIS (Paperback Library ed. 1968)
[hereinafter cited as BAKAL]; Delinquency Hearings 56-88, 593-612, 615-58 (remarks of Att'y
Gen. Ramsey Clark).
'The National Rifle Association of America (NRA) is the anti-legislation leader. General
views of the NRA may be found in practically every issue of The Rifleman. the organization's
official publication. See also NRA, The Gun Law Problem (1968). For more detailed argu-
ments held by the officers of the NRA, see Delinquency Hearings 192-207, 395-451 (remarks
of NRA Exec. Vice President Franklin L. Orth and President Harold NV. Glassen). See
also Hays, The Right to Bear Arns. A Study in Judicial Misinterpretation. 2 \W.%. &
MARY L. REv. 381 (1960); Olds,.The Second Amendment and the Right to Keep and Bear
Anns. 46 MICH. S.B.J. 15 (Oct. 1967); Sprecher, The Lost Amendment. 51 A.B.A.J. 554
(1965).
I See notes 18-52 iufra and accompanying text.
',See. e.g.. Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 98 (1968); United States v. Miller. 307
U.S. 174 (1939); Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506 (1937); Cases v. United States,
131 F.2d 916 (lst Cir. 1942).
"1 See note I supra.
"See. e.g.. Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 98 (1968); United States v. Miller, 307
U.S. 174 (1939); accord, United States v. Adams, I I F. Supp. 216 (S.D. Fla. 1935). In
Haynes. the registration requirement of the National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5841 (1964)
was successfully attacked on fifth amendment grounds. However, the Supreme Court
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federal courts have sanctioned firearms legislation enacted under
the commerce clause,t3 and recent Supreme Court decisions have
reaffirmed congressional power to enact a broad range of
regulatory legislation under this constitutional provision. 4
Furthermore, the "necessary and proper" clause of the
Constitution augments the commerce clause, empowering Congress
indicated that if immunity from specified prosecutions arising out of admissions of violations
through registration .were granted by the Act, registration might validly be required. See
notes 18-52 infra and accompanying text.
13 The Federal Firearms Act of 1938. ch. 850, 52 Stat. 1250, passed unde'r the Commerce
Clause, was upheld as a valid exercise of the powers of the Federal Government in two
Circuit Court cases. Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1942); United States v.
Tot, 131 F.2d 261 (2d Cir. 1942), rev'd on other grounds, 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
11 Recent cases state that virtually any intrastate activity affecting interstate commerce
may be federally regulated. See. e.g.. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379
U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); White v. United States, 395
F.2d 5 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 928 (1968). See also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S.
I11 (1942); The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870). In Heari ojfAtlanta and
McClung, Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, prohibiting, Inter alia. racial
discrimination in public accommodations establishments, was attacked as unconstitutional
on the ground that such legislation exceeded the granted powers of Congress. In both cases
the Act was upheld as a valid exercise of the commerce power. The Court said: "It is said
that the operation of the motel here is of a purely local character. But, assuming this to be
true, '[i]f it is interstate commerce that feels the pinch, it does not matter how local the
operation which applies the squeeze.' . . . the power of Congress to promote interstate
commerce also includes the power to regulate the local incidents thereof, including local
activities in both the States of origin and destination, which might have a substantial and
harmful effect upon that commerce." Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379
U.S. 241, 258 (1964). In Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. !11 (1942), a farmer sought to enjoin
the enforcement of a section of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 which levied a
penalty on excessive crops. He claimed the Act was unconstitutional as applied to him since
all the crops he raised were used on his farm, and thus had no relation to interstate
commerce, or, if it had some effect, it was indirect only, and not subject to regulation. The
Court, rejecting this claim, noted the broad and sweeping power of Congress under the
Commerce Clause, and observed that "[E]ven if appellee's activity be local and though it
may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress
if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce, and this irrespective of
whether such effect is what might at some earlier time have been defined as 'direct' or
'indirect.' " Id. at 125.
While the argument has not yet been made in any case, it would appear that
courts would have no difficulty in finding that firearms transported in intrastate commerce do
have a substantial effect on interstate commerce, if only because they are used to commit
crimes against travellers, thus causing economic loss or discouraging interstate travel.
Furthermore, legislation affecting purely local transactions, such as a national permit-to-
purchase and possess, would probably find justification under the "necessary and proper"
clause, on the grounds that without such a requirement there' could be no effective
enforcement of the ban on non-resident firearms sales.
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to pass laws implementing existing legislation in areas over Which it
has regulatory powers. 5
The interstate sale, shipment or transportation of firearms
seemingly comes directly under the commerce clause authority.
Supposing that a valid congressional purpose to curtail
circumvention of local laws through non-resident gun sales can be
posited, then under the commerce and "necessary and proper"
clauses Congress can validly enact laws to effectuate this purpose,
including regulation of wholly intrastate transactions. 16 Thus, the
real question is not whether Congress may regulate the transfer and
possession of firearms, but rather, how far such legislation may
constitutionally extend. 7
GUN CONTROL AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
In Haynes v. United States,8 the Supreme Court dealt the first
serious reversal to the National Firearms Act of 1934, and
explicitly delineated one of the constitutional limitations on gun
control legislation. As one of three closely related decisions 9
" See cases cited note 14 supra.
1 See, e.g.. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. (1942), discussed note 14 supra. In the landmark
case or United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), which upheld the provisions of the Fair
Labor Act of 1936 regulating wages and hours of employees engaged in the production of
goods involved in interstate commerce, the Court said, "The power of Congress over
interstate commerce is not confined to the regulation of commerce among the states. It
extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce or the exercise of
the power of Congress over it as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the
attainment of a legitimate end, the exercise of the granted power of Congress to regulate
interstate commerce." 312 U.S. at 118.
'- Whether or not there is any need for gun control legislation is also a matter of debate.
Avid firearms enthusiasts, such as the NRA and ardent firearms legislation advocates,
such as Sen. Thomas Dodd and author Carl Bakal, each employ statistics to establish the
need or lack of need for stringent firearms regulations. The NRA publishes a report on
firearms accidents and crimes which shows that firearms accidents accounted for 1.3 deaths
per 100,000 population in 1966, while automobiles killed 27.1 persons per 100,000, and that
the firearms homicide rate from 1930 to 1966 declined from 5.7 per 100,000 to 2.9. N.R.A.,
Statistics on Firearms in Accidents and Crime 1, 9 (no date), Bakal, on the other hand,
points out that some 800,000 civilian Americans have died by firearms since 1900, and that
now some 20,000, including suicides, suffer this fate yearly. BAKAL, supra note 7, at I. In
this book, Bakal emphasizes the reckless attitude of Americans toward firearms. For
assorted articles denying the necessity for gun control legislation, see generally Hays, supra
note 8: Olds. supra note 8; Sprecher, supra note 8, at 665.
" 390 U.S. 85 (1968).
12 The two related opinions handed down with Haynes were Marchetti v. United States,
390 U.S. 39 (1968) and Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968). In Marchetti,
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reaffirming the vitality of the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination,20 Haynes held that the privilege provided a complete
defense to a charge that the defendant failed to register his
possession- of a designated firearm as required by the 1934 statute3 l
Under the former section 5841 of the National Firearms Act,22
registration of various weapons was required.P Possession of a
firearm which violated any provision of the Act including
registration was declared unlawful!' In effect, failure to register
possession of a firearm, even though such possession was in
violation of the Act, was a separate offense. The conflict with the
privilege against self-incrimination was manifest, since one who
complied with the registration requirements and registered an illegal
weapon testified to a violation of the Act for which he was subject
defendant was convicted of conspiring to evade payment of the occupational tax on gamblers
imposed by 26 U.S.C. § 4411 (1964). and for failing to comply with 26 U.S.C. § 4412
(1964), which required those liable for the tax to register with the Internal Revenue Service.
Payment of the tax did not exempt the registrant from prosecution under state or federal anti-
wagering laws, id. § 4422. and federal officials are required to provide state or federal
prosecutors with lists of those paying the tax, id. § 6107. Defendant appealed on the ground
that the statutes in question violated his fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. The Supreme Court agreed with the defendant, overruling United States v.
Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953) and Lewis v. United States, 348 U.S. 419 (1955). which had
upheld similar convictions. Reversing the defendant's conviction, the Court held that a
person may not be compelled by law, upon pain of penalty, to furnish a government with
information which would furnish any governmental authority with a "'link in the chain* of
evidence" which could be used to convict him. 390 U.S. at 48, 54. Similarly, in Grosso,
defendant's conviction for failure to pay the required excise tax on gambling under 26
U.S.C. §§ 4401 & 4411 (1964), and 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1964), was also reversed.
The privilege against self-incrimination, as guaranteed by the fifth amendment, reads,
"nor shall [any person] be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."
U.S. Co sT. amend. V.
11 390 U.S. at 100.
21 Section 5841 was amended after Haynes to correct the constitutional defects. Conpare
Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 201 (1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 1413, 1415-16) with 26
U.S.C. § 5841 (1964), under which Haynes was prosecuted.
2 A transferee was exempted from registering those firearms which had been made or
transferred in compliance with the provisions of the Act. Former section 5848(l) defined
"firearm" for the purpose of the Act as: "a shotgun having a barrel or barrels of less than
18 inches in length, or a rifle having a barrel or barrels of less than 16 inches in length, or
any weapon made from a rifle or shotgun (whether by alteration, modification, or otherwise)
if such weapon as modified has an overall length of less than 26 inches, or any other weapon,
except a pistol or revolver, from which a shot is discharged by an explosive if such weapon is
capable of being concealed on the person, or a machine gun, and includes a muffler or
silencer for any firearm whether or not such firearm is included within the foregoing
definition."
21 Ch. 757, §§ 6, 10(b), 48 Stat. 1236, 1238, 1239 (1934).
FIREARMS REGULATION
to criminal prosecution. 5 The Government, said the Court, could
not subject a defendant to a choice of either registering and thereby
admitting possession of an unlawful weapon, or not registering and
risking a conviction under section 5851 for possession of a weapon
violating the registration requirement of section 5841, and any
other provision with which the firearm failed to comply.
Rejected also was the Government's argument that the Court
should uphold the conviction under section 5841 by "imposing
restrictions upon the use by state and federal authorities of
information obtained as a consequence of the registration
requirement." 2 1 The flaw in this suggested judicial legislation was
that it contravened the legislative intent to have the information
gathered under the registration statute passed on to state and
federal prosecutory authorities as commanded by 26 U.S.C. section
6107.27 Nevertheless, the Court refused to hold the provisions
unconstitutional on their face, on the ground that there were
situations in which possession of an unregistered weapon would not
violate section 5851 "-s
The Court made it equally clear that the Shapiro doctrine, which
removes "'required records" from the protection of the fifth
amendment, was inapplicable in this instance. Shapiro v. United
"' -The object [of the fifth amendment] was to insure that a person should not be
compelled, when acting as a witness in any investigation, to give testimony which might tend
to show that he himself committed a crime." Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562
(1892).
"An internal statutory defect in the fifth amendment sense exists where the statutory
scheme is so constructed that compliance with one section of the statute will compel the
defendant to admit to a violation of a related section of the same act." 13 'VILL. L. REv.
650. 654 n.34 (1968).
"What the government cannot do is compel information under one statute which
necessarily admits the violation of an unrelated criminal statute: this is the essence of self-
incrimination." Comment, Self-Incrimination and the Federal Excise Tax on Wagering. 76
YALE L.J. 839, 847 (1967). See generally 8 J. WIGM1oRE, EVIDENCE § 2251 (McNaughton
rev. ed. 1961); McKay, Self-Incriniination and the New Privacy, 1967 Sup. CT. REv. 193.
One critic has suggested, however, that by its language, the fifth amendment was designed
only to protect defendants at their own trial. Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construction of
the SeJ-Incriinization Clause, 29 MICH. L. REV. 1, 191, 195 (1930).
2 390 U.S. at 99.
2d. at 99-100.
-' The Government noted in its brief several instances in which registration would not lead
to criminal prosecution: "In the case of a making, one person can make a firearm by
modifying a weapon that is owned and possessed by another person. In such a case, the
owner commits no crime in connection with the making, but. if he wishes to continue to
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States29 held that records required to be kept by law fell outside the
ambit of fifth amendment protection if such records had three
characteristics: (1) the governmental purpose in requiring the
records to be kept was regulatory; (2) the material recorded was of
a nature which the registrant normally keeps; and (3) the records
assumed a "public aspect, '30 presumably by a legal requirement
that they be normally available for inspection by certain or all
members of the public.3 ' While it may be true that the essential
purpose of the Government in Haynes was regulatory, and it is
possible that manufacturers, dealers and importers normally keep
records of their transactions, it is equally true that requiring such
information to be recorded does not give the records a "public
aspect." Furthermore, private transferees would not customarily
record sales or gifts of firearms, nor would there be a "public
aspect" to such transactions. Nevertheless the National Firearms
Act sought to include such private transactions when they violated
the Act, as well as "public" sales between merchants and
customers. Thus, reasoned the Court, Shapiro did not apply here.
Relying heavily on the tests set forth in Albertson v. Subversive
Activities Control Board;32 the majority noted that sections 5841
and 5851 were not aimed at the general public but rather were
concerned with a "highly selective group inherently suspect of
criminal activities" in "an area permeated with criminal
statutes. '33 That the risk of prosecution for violation of the Act
was materially increased by registration was clear to the Court, for
possess the weapon after its modification he must register under Section 5841. That
registration can in no way incriminate him, but only serves to eliminate any possibility of
criminal prosecution.
"'IT]he filing obligation (under § 5814] is entirely the transferor's and not the transferee's.
A transferee could in good faith provide the transferor with all the information required, but
the transferor could fail to file, which would impose on the transferee a duty to register. If he
did register, he could be convicted of no crime." Brief for the United States at 19-20,
Haynes v. United State3, 390 U.S. 85 (1968). However, the Government did admit that such
situations were "uncommon." Id. at 20. Presumably also, registration would not incriminate
a person who found a lost or abandoned firearm which had been in violation of the Act. Cf.
Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 96 n.10 (1968).
- 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
-3 Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 34 (1948); see also 6 DUQUESNs L. Rev.
291, 297 (1968).
21 Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 33-34 n.42 (1948).
=z 382 U.S. 70 (1965). See note 36 hifra.
3 Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 98-99 (1968).
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they observed:
The registration requirement is . ..directed principally at
those persons who have obtained possession of a firearm without
complying with the Act's other requirements, and who therefore
are immediately threatened by criminal prosecution under sections
5851 and 58611
This defect, coupled with the "non-public aspect" of records of
firearms transactions, and the provisions of section 6107 which
required the federal government to give any information acquired
through registration to state officials, led the Court to conclude:
[A] proper claim of the constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination provides a full defense to prosecutions either for
failure to register a firearm under section 5841 or for possession of
an unregistered firearm under section 5851.5
The Haynes Court did not believe that its decision would
preclude effective regulation or taxation of firearms, but
nevertheless demonstrated that close judicial scrutiny would be
given to any registration statutes aimed at a "highly selective group
inherently suspect of criminal activity" and concerned with "an
area permeated with criminal statutes '."I6 Where registration might
form a "link in the chain of evidence" used for conviction of the
registrant for a related crime, the fifth amendment provides a
n Id. at 96.
Id. at 100.
390 U.S. at 98-99. Registration requirements have only recently encountered difficulties
under the self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment. See. e.g.. Leary v. United States,
395 U.S. 6 (1969) (marijuana); Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968) (firearms);
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968) (gamblers); Albertson v. Subversive Activities
Control Board, 382 U.S. 70 (1965) (Communists); cf. United States v. Minor, 398 F.2d 511,
512-13 (2d Cir. 1968) (narcotics).
Prior to Albertson, in which a statute requiring Communists to register with the
Subversive Activities Control Board was voided on the grounds that it violated the privilege
against self-incrimination, no registration statute had been held unconstitutional. See United
States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953) and Lewis v. United States, 348 U.S. 419 (1955)
(registration requirement for gamblers valid); United States v. Eramdjian, 155 F. Supp. 914
(S.D. Cal. 1957) (narcotics registration statute valid).
In distinguishing United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259 (1927), in which the Court
affirmed a conviction for failure to file an income tax statement despite the fact that the
filing would reveal illegally gained income, the Albertson Court said, "In Sullivan the
questions in the income tax return were neutral on their face and directed at the public at
large, but here they are directed at a highly selective group inherently suspect of criminal
activities. Petitioners' claims are not asserted in an essentially non-criminal and regulatory
area of inquiry, but against an inquiry in an area permeated with criminal statutes, where
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complete defense r7  Thus, federal registration requirements in
statutes dealing with Communists,. 8 narcoticss and gambling, 0
designed to gather information which might be used in criminal
prosecutions against registrants, have been declared in violation of
the privilege against self-incrimination." However, where
response to any of the form's questions in context might involve the petitioners in the
admission of a crucial element of a crime." 382 U.S. at 79. The tests of "aimed at a highly
selective group inherently suspect of criminal activity" and "an inquiry in an area permeated
with criminal statutes" are heavily relied upon by courts today, and have apparently been
adopted as the standard in self-incrimination cases. See Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S.
85. 98-99 (1968); Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 47 (1968); United States v.
Minor, 398 F.2d 511, 512 (2d Cir. 1968).
Despite the adoption of this standard, it would appear from the language of the fifth
amendment, and the interpretation rendered in Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562(1892). that the protection afforded should be available other than only when the information
required is more than merely incidental in establishing guilt of some crime. What in the
language of the privilege suggests that "merely incidental" information is not protected?
Perhaps the answer lies in the "balancing test." Where the information required is necessary
to the proper functioning of society or government, the fact that it may later provide a "link
in the chain of evidence" is not sufficient to warrant constitutional protection against
divulgence. Examples would be the use of marriage licenses to convict a bigamist, income tax
returns to convict a tax-evader, and an automobile registration to convict a hit-and-run
motorist.
'See. e.g.. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969); Haynes v. United States, 390
U.S. 85 (1968); Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968); Albertson v. Subversive
Activities Control Board, 382 U.S. 70 (1965); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547(1892). (Y. Galvan v. Superior Court. 452 P.2d 930, 76 Cal. Rptr. 642 (1969) (upholding
local registration ordinance since defendant not member of class for whom registration would
present substantial hazard of self-incrimination).
' Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. § 786(d)(4) (1964).
26 U.S.C. §§ 4701-76 (1964).
26 U.S.C. §§ 4401, 4411. 4412 (1964).
SThe registration requirement provisions of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950,
§§ 7(d)(4). 8(a) & (c) and 13 (a), 50 U.S.C. §§ 786(d)(4), 787(a) & (c), 792(a) (1964) uere
declared unconstitutional as violative of the privilege against self-incrimination in Albertson
v. Subversive Activities Control Boa'd, 382 U.S. 70 (1965). In upholding the conviction of a
seller who failed to comply with 26 U.S.C. § 4705(a), which forbids the sale of narcotics to
anyone without an order form issued by the Secretary of the Treasury, the Second Circuit
rejected defendant's claim that the requirement violated the self-incrimination clause of the
fifth amendment. United States v. Minor, 398 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1968). Defendant claimed
that as the provision required the purchaser, in effect, to register, such information would
tend to incriminate the buyer. Thus the requirement, under Haynes v. United States, 390
U.S. 85 (1968). Marchetti v. United States. 390 U.S. 39 (1968). and Albertson v. Subversive
Activities Control Board, 382 U.S. 70 (1965). was unconstitutional. The court tersely stated:
"Even if we were to assume argttendo that the registration and tax provisions infringe upon
the purchaser's Fifth Amendment rights . . . it hardly follows that a Seller . . . is immune
from prosecution for selling to a person who failed to provide the form. . . . [A] seller
cannot benefit from the privilege allegedly available to the buyer. . . . (lI]t is clear that
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registration requirements are "neutral" on their face and aimed at
the general public, no violation of the fifth amendment results.
There cannot be a fifth amendment objection simply because
registration might lead to conviction for a crime neither committed
nor contemplated at the time of registration. Accordingly, an
income tax statement must be filed regardless of the fact that some
of the requested information might lead to a conviction for illegal
traffic in liquor,12 and an automobile has to be registered regardless
of the fact that the state may use this evidence to trace, arrest and
convict a hit-and-run motorist.!3
When the Albertson tests of "suspect group," "area permeated
by criminal statutes" and "link in the chain of evidence" are
applied to firearms registration statutes, the result is not so clear as
when those tests are applied to the Communists registration
statutes, for which they were promulgated." If the government
places a transfer or manufacturing tax on all firearms, the purpose
Qf registration would be to enforce payment, a function similar to
that secured by income tax returns and automobile registration. No
"select group inherently suspect of criminal activity" would be the
subject of the statute, and a crucial element of the Albertson
objection would be avoided. Because the legislation would apply
essentially to a "non-criminal" group, firearms registration would
standing under the Fifth Amendment is not freely negotiable nor transferable." 398 F.2d at
513. The language of the court indicates that the registration requirement as regards the
purchaser may. indeed, be unconstitutional. 26 U.S.C. §§ 4401, 4411, 4412 (1964). requiring
registration under and payment of an excise and occupational tax on gambling, were declared
unconstitutional as violative of the privilege against self-incrimination in Marchetti v.
United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968) and Grosso v. United States. 390 U.S. 62 (1968).
1- United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259 (1927) (must file income tax return despite
revelation of illegal sources of income). A registrant may, however, invoke the privilege as to
specific questions asked in the form. Id. at 263.
r This use of automobile registrations has apparently never been challenged, and it is
doubtful that any court would sustain a fifth amendment argument in such a case.
"1 Unlike gambling, narcotics possession and Communist affiliation, firearms possession is
not as clearly an indication of the commission or intent to commit a crime. However, in
terms of the purpose and lethal nature of a firearm, especially a handgun, registration of a
firearm is more likely to lead to the discovery of a crime already committed than is an
income tax return or automobile registration. The effectiveness of firearms registration has
been questioned seriously, however. See DelinquencY Hearings 192-207. 395-451 (remarks of
Mr. Franklin L. Orth & Mr. Harold W. Glassen); Krug. Does Firearms Registration Worlk
(National Shooting Sports Foundation, Inc. 1968). But see Delinquency Hearings 83-88
(remarks of Att'y Gen. Ramsey Clark): Geisel, Roll & Wettick. The Ellectirene.s ol State
and Local Regulation of Handguns: A Statistical Analysis, 1969 DuKE L.J. 647.
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be more analogous to automobile than to Communist registration.
As such, it is probable that courts will disregard the fact that
registration may supply the state with information leading to the
conviction of a registrant for a crime committed with the registered
weapon. On the other hand, possession and ownership of firearms
might meet the Albertson criterion of an "area permeated with
criminal statutes." Since crimes by firearms are so frequent, courts
may deem this fact sufficient to hold that any attempted firearms
registration scheme would violate the fifth amendment.
Finally, the problem of the interaction of the fifth amendment
with federal firearms registration is further complicated by
restrictive state legislation. While federal laws do not as yet
prohibit ownership of any class of weapons, many states impose
restrictions on the weapons which may be privately owned, 4 and
forbid certain persons from owning or possessing any weapons.46
Under Haynes a defendant could not be convicted of failure to
register his firearm and pay the federal tax on it if possession is a
violation of state law 7 However, under Murphy v. Waterftont
Coninmission4 s immunity from state prosecution for illegal
possession might be granted by the federal statute, in which case
the defendant could be prosecuted for non-registration and non-
payment. Obviously, immunity will not support laws designed to
keep firearms out of the hands of persons the state feels should not
possess them.49 Nevertheless, law enforcement can reap a benefit
1 Machine guns are prohibited by many states; see. e.g.. Cox. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-
202 (1960); IOWA CODE § 696.1 (1950); N.J. STAT. A.,N. tit. 2A, § 151-50 (1953).
16 Many states forbid sale to, purchase by and possession by such classes as ex-felons, drug
addicts and habitual drunks. See. e.g.. ALA. CODE tit. 14, §§ 174, 178 (1959) (pistols); CAL.
PE NAL CODE §§ 12021, 12025 (Vest 1956) (concealed weapons); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 29-29 (1960); HAWAIH REv. LAWS § 7 (1955); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 24-3 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1969); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.05(6) (MeKinney 1967).
' 390 U.S. 85 (1968).
" 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
11 Id. Petitioners. subpoenaed to testify before the waterfront Commission of New York
Harbor concerning a work stoppage, were granted immunity from state prosecution in New
York and New Jersey for any matter arising out of their testimony. They still refused to
answer, on the ground that they were still subject to federal prosecution, and hence came
within the protection of the fifth amendment. Held in contempt by the New Jersey coirt,
petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, reversing the contempt
conviction, nevertheless ordered the witnesses to answer on the grounds that the immunity
granted was complete and extended to possible prosecution under both state and federal law.
Noting that "the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination protects a state witness
(Vol. 1969: 773
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from a general firearms registration law with an immunity clause
by providing alternative criminal charges against those owning a
federally unregistered firearm, in violation of state possession laws.
Although immunity from state prosecution must be granted if
failure to register is charged, it would be possible to forego the
federal complaint and have local authorities file charges for illegal
possession. Furthermore, where firearms crimes are committed by
registered weapons, ownership can be traced in a manner similar to
that used for locating the owner of an automobile, thereby assisting
law enforcement. 50 Unfortunately, the value of federal gun
registration alone is minimal.' Because a federal registration law,
by itself, arguably affords protection to those who violate state and
local gun possession laws,52 more is needed to ensure enforcement
of local controls. But what more can be achieved depends upon the
limitations of the second amendment 3
GUN CONTROL AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT
The relatively few Supreme Court interpretations of the second
amendment seem to establish two propositions: (I) the" second
amendment limits only the federal government; and (2) the second
amendment is a "collective" guarantee, designed to ensure the
against incrimination under federal as well as state law and a federal witness against
incrimination under state as well as federal law," id. at 77-78, the Court held "the
constitutional rule to be that a state witness may not be compelled to give testimony which
may be incriminating under federal law unless the compelled testimony and its fruits cannot
be used in any manner by federal officials in connection with a criminal prosecution against
him. We conclude, moreover, that in order to implement this constitutional rule and
accommodate the interests of the State and Federal Governments in investigating and
prosecuting crime, the Federal Government must be prohibited from making any such use of
compelled testimony and its fruits." Id. at 79.
:' See BAKAL. supra note 7, at 97: Comment, Federal Regulation oj Firearms Sales, 31 U.
CHi. L. REV. 780, 785 n.27, 789 (1964). Delinquency Hearings 84, 619 (remarks of Att'y
Gen. Ramsey Clark).
In a study of homicides committed in 1967 in Chicago, it was revealed that approximately
7517 of the murders were committed by an acquaintance of the victim and that 57'4 of all
homicides by weapons were committed with firearms. Presumably a large percentage of these
were committed by persons with no previous criminal record, and who, probably, would
presently qualify for legal ownership of the firearm used to complete the crime. Zimring, Is
Gun Control Likely to Reduce Violent Killings? 35 U. Cm. L. Rtiv. 721, 722, 726 n.8
(1968). See also Note, Firearms: Problems oj Control, 80 HARv. L. R:V. 1328, 1345 (1967).
F1 See Delinquency Hearings. supra note 5, at 193-95 (remarks of Franklin L. Orth).
See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
" "A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the
people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed." U.S. COXST. amend. II.
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preservation of a well-regulated militia, necessary to the security of
a free state. Although there is ample linguistic justification for
these views, the text of the amendment lends itself equally well to
other, conflicting interpretations.
By holding that the second amendment applies only to the
federal government,51 courts imply that the provision must be a
"states rights" guarantee 5 That is, the "free state" with whose
security the amendment is concerned, must be each individual
member of the Union, rather than the "nation-state." Under this
reading, the clause guarantees that the federal government will not
be permitted to interfere with the internal mobilization of each state
for its own security. But then, of what meaning is Article IV,
section 4 of the United States Constitution? "The United States
• . .shall protect each [State] against Invasion; and on Application
of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot
be convened) against domestic Violence." If it is the duty of the
Federal Government to protect the states, what is the need for a
constitutional amendment prohibiting the federal power from
denying a state the opportunity to form its own militia? Perhaps an
answer lies in the fear of the original states that the natipnal
government would envelop them.55 Viewed in this light it would
5 See. e.g.. Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535. 538 (1894); Presser v. Illinois. 116 U.S. 252.
264-65 (1886); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542. 553 (1875): United States v. Tot,
131 F.2d 261, 266 (3d Cir. 1942), rer'd on other grounds., 319 U.S. 463 (1943); Galvan v.
Superior Court, 452 P.2d 930, 76 Cal. Rptr. 642 (1969); People v. Scale, 78 Cal. Rptr. 811,
815-16 (Ct. App. 1969).
See. e.g.. United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261, 266 (3d Cir. 1942), rei'd on other
grounds., 319 U.S. 463 (1943); Hill v. State, 53 Ga. 472, 473 (1874).
1 See I A.,\ALS oi. CoNG. 749-52 (1789); THF FEDERALIST Nos. 25, 29 (A. Hamilton). As
was pointed out in Ti: F-)]:RA.IST No. 25, at 159 (J. Cooke ed. 1961): "Reasons have been
already given to induce a supposition that the State Governments will too naturally be prone
to a rivalship with that of the Union, the foundation of which will be the love of power ....
If. . . the ambition of the members should be stimulated by the separate and independent
possession of military forces, it would afford too strong a temptation, and too great facility
to them to make enterprises upon. and finally to subvert the constitutional authority of the
Union. On the other hand. the liberty of the people would be less safe in this state of things,
than in that which left the national forces in the hands of the national government." Though
preferring a national force, on balance. THn FIhDEiRAL.IST supported the idea of a National
Militia, led by state officers, a plan embodied in Article 1. § 8 of the Constitution. Id., No.
29. As "Publius" stated. "There is something so far fetched and so extravagent in the idea of
danger to liberty from the militia. ... ld. No. 29. at 185.
Of course, Tin: FEDI:RAt.lST was written to support passage of the Constitution itself, not
the later Bill of Rights, but the comments and observations with respect to the militia are
pertinent to a discussion of the second amendment, reflecting substantively the fears of
contemporary America.
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appear that Article I V, section 4 and the second amendment, given
its present interpretation, mesh very well indeed. The Constitution
mandates the duty of the Federal Government to protect its
members from the external foe and internal rebel but insures that
the states shall have an unassailable right to protect themselves
against encroachment by the central authority. However, Article
IV, section 4 is not the only constitutional provision which may be
read in conjunction with the second amendment.
Article I, section 8, clauses 15 and 16 cloak Congress with
power to provide for the organizing, arming, disciplining and
calling forth of the militia;5 7 trained by the states in such manner as
Congress prescribes-'8 Presumably, these are the troops to be
dispatched to quell disorders and repel invasions contemplated in
Article IV, section 4. In light of this portion of the Constitution,
the second amendment may be seen as protecting another interest,
wholly separate from any state interest in avoiding military
takeover by the federal government-the right of the Federal
Government to have at its disposal a militia, the right of whose
members "to keep and bear arms" may not be infringed by state
governments 9 While this interpretation has never been directly
espoused by any court, dictum by the United States Supreme Court
in Presser v. Illinois indicates that such a view is not wholly
frivolous.
The Illinois statute which was challenged in Presser required
irregulars who sought to form an organized militia or military
I-or the meaning or the word "militia." see notes 87-93 infra and accompanying text.
" Article i. § 8. cls. 15 & 16 provide that Congress shall have power: "'[151 To provide for
calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel
Invasions:
"[161 To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing
such Part or them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the
States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the
Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress."
" Cf. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875). Defendants were indicted under
§ 6 of the Enforcement Act of 1870 for conspiring, inter alia, to prevent two Negroes from
bearing arms. The Court, affirming an order for arrest of judgment on the grounds that the
Act was beyond the power of Congress. observed of the second amendment, "'This is one of
the amendments that has no other effect than to restrict the powers of the national
government, leaving the people to look for their protection against any violation by their
fellow-citizens of the rights it recognizes, to . . . the 'powers which relate to merely
municipal Iegislation," or what was, perhaps, more properly called internal police ... " Id.
at 553.
116 U.S. 252 (1886).
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units to obtain a license from the governor if they wished to meet
or drill within the state. Presser, in defiance of the law, led some
400 rifle-bearing members of a German nationalist group down the
streets of Chicago, without having procured the requisite license.
Arrested, convicted and fined $10, Presser appealed on the ground,
inter alia, that. the statute violated the second amendment. While
admitting that the second amendment was a prohibition on the
Federal Government, and not on the states, Presser claimed that
the statute interfered with his right to keep and bear arms on behalf
of a national purpose, in violation of the Constitution." The
question of his personal right to keep and bear arms was not
argued by the defendant. 2
1I d. at 257-60 (argument for plaintiff-in-error).
Id. at 258 (argument for plaintiff-in-error). The plaintiff-in-error indicated that lie was
not contending for second amendment protection of an individual right by this statement:
"Whether a State may not prohibit its citizens from keeping or bearing arms for other than
militia purpose is a question which need not be considered, as the Illinois statute is aimed
against the organizing, arming and drilling of bodies of men as militia, except as they belong
to the Illinois National Guard. ... Id.
If it is true that the second amendment is unconcerned with individual rights and is,
instead, focused on the protection of a 'governmental" right, a rather interesting
"standing" question arises: why should a court entertain a private party's argument that his
right to keep and bear arms is protected by the second amendment? If the second
amendment is designed to shield the states from encroachment by the federal government,
only the states may invoke its protection. CY. Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley
Authority, 306 U.S. 118, 143-44 (1939). Similarly, if the second amendment is deemed to
protect the federal government's right to access to trained troops, then it alone may call
upon that amendment in attacking a law interfering with that right. In either event, an
individual has no standing to raise a second amendment defense, since it is not his legal
right, but that of a political entity, which is allegedly being violated. This problem
apparently was recognized by the defendant in Presser, who urged not that his individual
right was violated, but that the state law in question infringed upon the federal government's
right to have a militiaman keep and bear arms. The Court, however, was unable to find a
basis for a contention that he was suing on behalf of the federal government. Other cases
dealing with second amendment claims such as United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939),
and United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261 (3d Cir. 1942), revd on other grounds, 319 U.S. 463
(1943), have dealt with the "individual right" argument on the merits, concluding that the
second amendment was not a guardian of an individual's right to keep and bear arms, but
have never even suggested that a question of standing existed. The paradox is readily
apparent: If the second amendment protects a "governmental right," then an individual
claim or defense based on the second amendment should be dismissed for want of standing,
without a discussion of the merits. If. however, the individual does have standini to raise a
second amendment argument on his own behalf, then it would appear that the right protected
is, indeed. individual, and present decisional law is erroneous. While there is no ready
explanation for the existence of this paradox. it would appear that the opinions of the courts
have, in effect, determined the standing issue indirectly and against the individual claim.
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The Supreme Court affirmed Presser's conviction on the
grounds that the second amendment does not apply to the States.
The Court noted that the statute "which only forbids bodies of
men to associate together as military organizations, or to drill or
parade with arms in cities and towns unless authorized by law,"
did not infringe upon the right to keep and bear arms 3 However,
as to Presser's argument that the statute denied the right of the
people to keep and bear arms for the purpose of organizing as a
militia, and thus denied the United States Government a source for
its military, the Court observed:
It is undoubtedly true that all citizens capable of bearing arms
constitute the reserved military force or reserve militia of the
United States as well as of the States, and, in view of this
prerogative of the general government, as well as of its general
powers, the States cannot, even laying the constitutional provision
in question out of view, prohibit the people from keeping and
bearing arms, so as to deprive the United States of their rightfid
resource .or maintaining the public security, and disable the people
from performing their duty to the general government. But, as
already stated, we think it clear that the sections under
consideration do not have this effectP
Thus, while the Court held the second amendment not applicable to
the states, it nonetheless recognized that there were limits beyond
Nevertheless, by not explicitly decidifig the standing issue, courts have left open the
possibility that an "individual right" argument, if persuasive in a specific suit, might prevail
to the limited extent of the facts of that case.
1 16 U.S. at 264-65.
"Id. at 265-66 (emphasis added). But this is a most unsatisfactory analysis, because such
a statute could "have this effect." If a state does not train a militia, does not allow those
without licenses the right to organize and train privately, and refuses to issue any such
licenses, a "'well regulated militia" is eJJecttvely denied, despite the possibility that the
citizens could parade and drill without weapons, and practice the use of arms individually.
Perhaps the Court sought to avoid granting constitutional sanction to roving bands of armed
private armies.
One commentator has suggested that even in today's world, the trained and armed private
citizen, as part of the universal "'private militia," apparently, forms a vital part of the
national security. "With the urgent need for civil defense and particularly if the 'stand-by
home guard' is ever incorporated into the national army, is it not important that as wide a
base of the citizenry as possible be armed and somewhat trained? Armed and trained citizens
may not prevent an atomic attack, but they can preserve internal order after one." Sprecher,
supra note 8, at 667. The Supreme Court, in United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
noted that the framers of the amendment viewed the militia as "comprised [of] all males
physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense." Id. at 179.
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which a state could not constitutionally go. Unfortunately, the
Court did not state specifically the basis of the limitation upon the
states. Presumably, this limitation results from Article I, section 8,
clause 16 of the Constitution, which provides for the availability of
volunteer troops from each state for service to the national
government85
Despite the reluctance of the courts to hold the second
amendment applicable to the states, there appears to be a valid
argument to the contrary. The argument finds support in the
construction of the first amendment, which states that "Congress
shall make no law." The second amendment simply provides that
the right protected "shall not be infringed," without specifying
against whom the prohibition applies. Arguably, then, no one may
infringe the right to keep and bear arms. Courts, however, in their
interpretation of the amendment, have added "by Congress,""8
without substantial explanation for this limitation, other than that
the first ten amendments to the United States Constitution are
restrictions upon the federal authority and not upon the states. 7
With the piecemeal incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment,"8 this explanation is no
longer acceptable, and if the second amendment is to be limited
only to a prohibition on the federal government, a new rationale
must be found.
The second often recited principle regarding the second
amendment is that the guarantee extends to the collective right of
the people to be secure in their establishment of a well regulated
militia, rather than to the individual's right to keep and bear
arms. 9 Indeed, there is nothing to suggest that it was designed to
See note 58 supra.
E.g.. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875); Exparte Rameriz, 193 Cal.
633, 651,226 P. 914,921 (1924); People v. Seale, 78 Cal. Rptr. 811,816 (Ct. App. 1969).
'- See Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535, 538 (1894); United States v. Cruikshank. 92 U.S.
542, 553 (1875); Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 921 (1st Cir. 1942); State v. Kerner,
181 N.C. 574, 575, 107 S.E. 222, 223 (1921).
11 Various provisions in the Bill of Rights have been "incorporated" into the fourteenth
amendment, and hence have been held applicable to the states, over the past decade. See,.
e.g.. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (sixth amendment assistance of
counsel); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (eighth amendment cruel and unusual
punishment); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (fourth amendment).
"See. e.g.. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939); Cases v. United States. 131
F.2d 916, 922 (Ist Cir. 1942); United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261, 266 (3d Cir. 1942), rev'd
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protect this individual "right,"7 and it is of some interest to note
that at least one state constitution seeking to preserve the individual
right expressly declares that the citizens of the state have the "right
to keep and bear arms in defense of themselves and the State."'
Nevertheless, one early state court opinion72 provides an argument
on other grounds, 319 U.S. 463 (1943); United States v. Adams, II F. Supp. 216, 219 (S.D.
Fla. 1935); Hill v. State, 53 Ga. 472, 474 (1874) (dicta); cf. Salina v. Blaksley, 72 Kan. 230,
231-32, 83 P. 619, 620 (1905) (state constitutional provision). But cf. Bliss v.
Commonwealth, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 90 (1822) (state constitutional provision), discussed note 70
htfra.
, See I ANNALS OF CoNG. 749-52 (1789); Brabner-Smith, Firearm Regulation. I LAW &
COrE.NIP. PROB. 400, 410-12 (1934). Some isolated state cases have, however, held that the
second amendment does protect the individual right to keep and bear arms. In Bliss v.
Commonwealth, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 90 (1822), the defendant, convicted or carrying a concealed
sword, in violation of a state statute, appealed on the ground that the law violated the
Kentucky Constitution, Article 10. § 23, which stated that: "TiThe right of the citizens to
bear arms in defense of themselves and the state, shall not be questioned." Without citing
any authority for the proposition, the Supreme Court of Kentucky said that the right of the
individual to keep and bear arms existed prior to the constitutional guarantee. Id. at 92.
After making an unconvincing distinction between "'prohibition," which was invalid, and
.'regulation," which was valid, the court stated: '[lI]t is the right to bear arms in defense of
the citizens and the state, that is secured by the constitution, and whatever restrains the full
and complete exercise of that right, though not an entire destruction of it, is forbidden by the
explicit language of the constitution." Id. at 91-92. The conviction was duly reversed. Within
a few years this decision was rendered ineffectual by an amendment of the constitution, in
which the words "shall not be questioned" were stricken, and the phrase "'subject to the
power of the General Assembly to enact laws to prevent persons from carrying concealed
weapons" was added. KY. CONST. § l,,cf. 7.
Only two other decisions adopted a restricted view of the power of the legislature to
regulate firearms. In State v. Kerner, 181 N.C. 574, 107 S.E. 222 (1921), the North Carolina
Supreme Court, declaring a state statute forbidding the carrying of unconcealed weapons off
one's property without a permit to be in violation of a state constitutional provision similar
to the amended Kentucky constitution, stated, "This exception indicates the extent to which
the right or the people to bear arms can be restricted; that is, the Legislature can prohibit the
carrying of concealed weapons but no further." Id. at 575, 107 S.E. at 223.
In In re Brickey, S Idaho 597, 70 P. 609 (1902), the Idaho Supreme Court struck down a
statute prohibiting the carrying of a loaded weapon within the city limits. Noting that the
Idaho constitution permitted the regulating of the bearing of arms, the court held that the
legislature might "regulate the exercise of this right, but may not prohibit it." Id. at 599, 70
P. at 609.
This fuzzy distinction with respect to the prohibition or regulation of the bearing of arms
has not been accepted in other jurisdictions, and it appears settled now that the state has the
power to prohibit the carrying of concealed weapons, or require a permit for this activity.
See, e.g., People ex rel. Darling v. Warden, 154 App. Div. 413, 139 N.Y.S. 277 (1913)
(prohibition of possession of concealable weapon held valid); Ex parte Thomas, 21 Okla.
770, 97 P. 260 (1908) (prohibition of carrying of concealed weapons held valid). All 50 states
now either forbid the carrying of a concealed handgun, or require a permit to do so.
71 Ky. CoNST. § I, cl. 7 (emphasis added). See note 70 supra.
Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 90 (1822).
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by analogy that the second amendment of the Federal Constitution
was directed to the individual right, and recent critics of gun
control legislation also adhere to this position 3  In view of the
"'conflicting" interpretations of this aspect of the second
amendment, it is worthwhile to examine the basis for each
argument.
Historically, it appears that the "right" of men to keep and
bear arms centered on the belief that an armed, trained citizenry,
denominated a "militia," was the best method of preserving the
autonomy of the state and the freedom of its inhabitants. Both
Plato ' and Aristotle s agreed that an equipped militia, well versed
in the arts of war, comprised of the able-bodied members of the
community, was preferable to a standing army which might be
employed by a despotic government to subvert the freedom of the
people. Familiarity with the use of weapons was essential to a
militia and this could best be achieved through the private
ownership of the weapons employed by the potential soldiers.
Nevertheless, it was recognized early that the untrammelled bearing
of arms was a danger to the public, subject to governmental
regulation. The Statute made at Northampton, of 1328,76
prohibited individuals from riding armed at night, or attending
fairs, markets, courts or churches while armed. In this manner the
principle was established that, while individuals might keep arms,
the bearing of weapons could be regulated with respect to time and
place.
13 See generally Hays, supra note 8; Olds, supra note 8; Sprecher, supra note 8. The
viewpoint of the National Rifle Association can be gleaned from any of their literature. See,
for example, NRA, Standing Firm (no date); NRA. The Gun Law Problem (1968);
NRA, The Truth About Guns (1967); NRA. -Be It Enacted" May Mean Goodbye
Guns (1968) reprinted, Delinquency Hearings 414-19.
"I PLATO'S DiALOGUES, Laws viii: 829 (B. Jowett Trans. 1892).
7 In his TReATISE ON GOVERN.MEIeNT, Aristotle advised that "as a city is composed or
persons of different ages, some young and some old, the fathers should teach their sons,
while they were very young, a light and easy exercise; [and] when they are grown up, they
should be perfect in every warlike exercise." ARISTOTLE'S PoLrrics, Book VI, ch. vii, (Ellis
Trans. 1912).
"The Statute made at Northampton, 2 Edw. IlI, c. 3, 1328 (1 Dawson's Stats. 257. 258
(1963)), is often cited as authority for the proposition that the right to keep and bear arms
was not a fundamental common law.right, since it was subject to governmental regulation.
Issued as a public safety measure, the law forbade persons to "go nor ride armed by night or
by day, in Fairs, Markets, nor in the presence of the Justices or other Ministers, nor in no
part elsewhere." See. e.g., BAKAL, supra note 7, at 295-304; Emery, The Constitutional
Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 28 HARV. L. REv. 473, 474 (1915); Haight, The Right to
Keep and Bear Arms, 2 BILL OF RIGHTs REv. 31, 31-35 (1941).
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The value of arms to the-individual for his own protection was
recognized by the English Bill of Rights, section 7, which provided,
"That the subjects which are protestants, may have arms for their
defence suitable to their condition, and as allowed by law." r Since
the right protected was extended by the government and only to
certain subjects, "suitable to their condition and as allowed by
law," it is difficult to perceive how this right to keep and bear
arms could be characterized in 1682 as "absolute." 7
Whether the framers of the American Bill of Rights intended to
guarantee the individual's right to keep and bear arms for any
purpose or solely for the protection of "the people" is unclear 9
Most analysts favor the latter view 0 Keenly aware of the value of
- I Win. & M., sess. 2, c. 2, § 7 (1688) (4 Halsbury's Stats. 152 2d ed. 1948).
71 An early, influential state case, Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. 152, 2 Humph. 154 (1840),
pointed out that section 7 of the English Bill of Rights was adopted for the protection of a
single group-the Protestants-in response to their complaint of disarmament by their
political and religious enemies, the Catholics. The guarantee was for the public-not
private-defense of their rights against governmental infringement. The court observed, "'No
private defence was contemplated, or would have availed anything. If the subjects had been
armed, they could have resisted the payment of excessive fines, or the infliction of illegal and
cruel punishments. When. therefore, Parliament says that 'subjects which are Protestants
may have arms for their defence, suitable to their condition, as allowed by law,' it does not
mean for private defence, but, being armed, they may as a body rise up to defend their just
rights, and compel their rulers to respect the laws. This declaration of right is made in
reference to the fact before complained of, that the people had been disarmed, and soldiers
had been quartered among them contrary to law." Id. at 155, 2 Humph. at 157. One critic
apparently has interpreted this collective right to defend just rights against governmental
tyranny as an absolute right to revolt, and derivatively, as an absolute right of the individual
to keep and bear arms in order to revolt. Hays, supra note 8. This view does not appear to
have widespread acceptance.
-James Madison, addressing the first session of Congress, in June, 1789, suggested as one
amendment to the Constitution, "The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be
infringed; a well armed and well regulated militia being the best security of a free country:
but no person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms shall be compelled to render military
service in person." I ANNALS oF CONG. 434 (1789). The fact that the clause was altered to
emphasize the "militia-preservation" purpose of the guarantee tends to indicate the intent of
the framers. However, Elbridge Gerry, during the debate in Congress pointed out that the
government in power could use the "religiously icrupulous" clause to disarm a part of the
people, and thus take over power absolutely. Id. at 749. Subsequent debate led to the deletion
of the phrase, id. at 75 1, which might produce a reading more indicative of a personal right
to arms possession for defense of self or a particular group, rather than of "the people"
collectively. However, this argument seems tenuous in light of the framers' desire to
maintain a militia rather than a standing army, which indicates that no thought of an
individual right to keep and bear arms was entertained. Indeed, the ANNALS contain no
mention of such an individual right. See also Feller & Gotting, The Second Amendment: A
Second Look, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 46, 61-62 (1966).
See authority cited in note 69 supra. See also BAKAL, supra note 7, at 296-304; Emery,
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an armed citizenry in overthrowing foreign rule, and faced with a
body of jealous political entities seeking to unite under a central
government stronger than the ineffectual Confederation, the
drafters of the Constitution saw the militia as a source of defense
in times of war, and as a means of minimizing fears of the states
from attack by each other and by the central government."
Therefore, to allay the people's fears of the state governments, and
the states' fears of the possible tyranny of the central government,
and to provide a means of national protection, the second
amendment was proposed and ratified8 2 There does not appear to
have been any mention of a desire to protect constitutionally the
individual right to armed self-protection.
Historical fact, however, reveals another relevant aspect of the
status of weapons at the time the Constitution was adopted.
Firearms, notably muskets, were vital tools for many Ameri-
cans. They were used as a means of defense, sport and hunting.
Without meat markets, police forces and other modern serv-
ices, firearms were crucial to the existence of the frontiersman.
Presumably, frontier Americans could safely assume they had a
right to their longguns, for without them, they could not survive.
But this fact does not mean that the right to own a firearm became
a common law right after 1792, since the explicit constitutional
provisions dealing with the right to keep and bear arms implicitly
denied that the right was individual.
Textually, two phrases of the second amendment are important
in determining whether it guarante an individual rather than a
collective right to keep and bear arms. The first is "the people"
and the second is "bear arms."" As one critic observed:
When the drafters of the Constitution desired to refer to the
individual or to individual rights, privileges, or immunities, they
never referred to "the people" but referred to "persons" . . . .
The significance of this phrase, when viewed in this light, becomes
readily apparent when read in conjunction with "bear arms."
supra note 76, at 476-77; Feller & Gotting, supra note 79, at 53-62, 69; Haight, supra note
76, at 31-34. But see Hays, supra note 8; Olds, supra note 8; Sprecher, supra note 8.
"I See note 56 supra.
12 Unfortunately, there is virtually no discussion of the second amendment in the legislative
history of the Bill of Rights. See note 70 supra and accompanying text.
-1 See Brabner-Smith, supra note 70, at 411-12.
TMId. at 411.
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"Bearing arms" connotes a military endeavor, rather than the
individual carrying of a weapon. 5 The position that the second
amendment refers only to the collective right of the people to take
up weapons in behalf of the common defense receives added
support from the introductory clause-"A well-regulated Militia,
being necessary to the security of a free State." Thus, the text of
the amendment does not appear to support the view that the
individual right to keep and bear arms is constitutionally protected.
From the foregoing discussion it may be concluded that the
right to which the second amendment refers is the collective right of
the people of a state, acting in their capacity as members of the
militia. While courts refuse to extend the limitations of the
amendment to the states, it appears, nevertheless, that there is a
limit upon regulation of arms beyond which a state may not go 6
However, until a court finds that a state regulation interferes with
federal access to a well-regulated militia, it is unlikely that the
second amendment will be held applicable to the states. If then, the
right protected by the second amendment is so narrow, what is the
permissive scope of federal firearms legislation?
Though the question has been rarely litigated, 7 the definition of
the word "militia" is crucial to the issue of the scope and
limitation of the second amendment. If, in fact, the purpose of the
second amendment was to provide the citizenry with a means of
keeping state governments in check, then the "militia" would
appear to be an extra-governmental body, privately organized and
trained. If, on the other hand, the militia was intended to supply
soldiers to defend the nation against attack by invaders, or to
protect the state against encroachment by the federal government,
then the word might describe a preference for a body of state-
organized and trained volunteers, rather than a professional
standing army 8l In theory, these two functions are incompatible.
"Hill v. State, 53 Ga. 472, 474 (1874).
"1 See Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886), discussed notes 60-68 supra and
accompanying text.
17 Presser seems to be the only Supreme Court case dealing directly with the question of
the deinition of the word -militia."
1 It appears that the latter function was intended. See THE FEDERALIST No. 29, at 181 (J.
Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton): "'The power of regulating the militia and of commanding its
services in times of insurrection and invasion are natural incidents to the duties of
superintending the common defence, and of watching over the internal peace of the
conFederacy."
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While the private body is designed to prevent encroachment upon
the people by the state government, it does not appear that it would
qualify for the purposes of a militia as contemplated either in
Article I section 811 or Article IV, section 4.1" On the other hand,
it is equally clear that state-controlled troops, while effective
against possible tyranny from the central government, and useful in
defending the nation against a common foe, would probably not be
very reliable in defense of the people against state-encroachment, as
the militia would be a unit of that government. As seen in Presser
v. Illinois," the Supreme Court has defined the militia as a
governmentally-controlled body, rather than a privately organized
army, and this is the definition which is generally accepted today."
If, however, the militia referred to in the second amendment is a
governmentally organized and trained body of troops, to what
extent may legislation impair the private keeping and bearing of
arms?
It is readily apparent from the foregoing analysis of the second
amendment that if the amendment were designed to protect the
states from federal encroachment, Congress might prohibit private
ownership of firearms, provided that the state were permitted to
furnish the arms necessary for equipping a well-regulated militia.
Thus, "the people" in their collective sense would still maintain the
right to keep and bear arms, though the individual right to do so,
which has never been constitutionally protected, would be denied.
If, on the other hand, the amendment were designed to insure the
availability of a militia to the federal government, then any
constitutional difficulty which might arise under Article IV, section
4,93 could be avoided by a congressional act requiring the states to
maintain an armory to provide able-bodied citizens with those arms
"[Dlesirable uniformity can only be accomplished by confiding the regulation of the
militia to the direction of the national authority." Id. See also United States v. Miller, 307
U.S. 174, 178-82 (1939). The NRA, in its literature, takes the position that there is really
a bifurcated meaning of the word "militia." "Anti-gun spokesmen claim militia' means
only the National Guard and like organizations. They could hardly be more wrong. The
nation has 2 kinds of militia, organized and unorganized. The latter consists of virtually all
able-bodied males. " NRA, The Truth About Guns 6 (1967) (emphasis in original).
See note 58 supra.
O See page 788 supra for the text of this provision.
"116 U.S. 252 (1886).
n Cf. Sprecher, supra note 8, at 668.
See notes 54-60 supra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 1969: 773
Vol. 1969: 773] FIREARMS REGULATION
the federal government deems necessary to preserve a militia.
Neither the courts nor the governments, however, have stated that
the second amendment could be construed so narrowly.
Concluding then that the second amendment guarantees a
collective right to keep and bear arms in order to preserve a militia,
a final question arises as to the types of arms included within the
protection of the provision.
With the exception of a Kentucky case of 1822, Bliss v.
Comnonwealth,94 holding that the right to keep and bear arms, as
guaranteed in the state constitution, was an absolute individual
right which could in no manner be infringed, courts are in
agreement that the second amendment protects the collective right
of the people to keep and bear such arms as are necessary to
preserve a well-regulated militia 5 While there is no unanimity,
most courts would include rifles, shotguns and other conventional
longguns.Y Pistols, revolvers and handguns have been explicitly
denied protection from regulation by some courts, 7 while given
constitutional protection by others. 8 The difficulty in determining
the status of handguns, which are of deep concern to most present
day gun control advocates, 9  can probably be traced to the
"12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 90 (1822). See note 70 supra.
The Supreme Court of Kansas observed that "The provisions in section 4 of the bill of
rights [of Kansasi that 'the people have the right to bear arms for their defense and security'
refers to the people as a collective body. . . . It deals exclusively with the military;
individual rights are not considered in this section." Salina v. Blaksley, 72 Kan. 230, 231-32,
83 P. 619, 620 (1905). The Third Circuit, in United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261, 266 (3d Cir.
1942). rev'd on other grounds, 319 U.S. 463 (1943). and a Florida federal district court, in
United States v. Adams, I I F. Supp. 216, 219 (S.D. Fla. 1935), drew similar conclusions
regarding the second amendment. But the argument has been made that the individual right
to keep and bear arms extends to an active member of the organized militia. The difficulty,
of course, with this position, is the varied definitions of the words "militia" and
"'organized."
" See. e.g., United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939): Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d
916 (1st Cir. 1942); c/. Parmon v. Lemmon, 244 P. 227 (Kan. 1926) (on rehearing); Salina v.
Blaksley, 72 Kan. 230, 83 P. 619 (1905); Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. 152, 2 Humph. 154
(1840).
V See. e.g., People ex rel. Darling v. Warden, 154 App. Div. 413, 139 N.Y.S. 277 (1913);
Exparte Thomas, 21 Okla. 770, 97 P. 260 (1908) (state constitutional provision).
'-See State v. Kerner, 181 N.C. 574, 107 S.E. 222 (1921); In re Brickley, 8 Idaho 597, 70
P. 609 (1902). See also Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 90 (1822) (limited by
constitutional amendment, see note 70 supra).
"See generally BAKAL, supra note 7; Delinquency Hearings. supra note 5; Hearings on S.
Res. 63 BeJore the Subconnn. to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 14 (1963).
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unfortunate looseness of language in several federal court cases
which attempted to describe the weapons subject to regulation.
The Supreme Court, affirming a conviction under the National
Firearms Act of 1934, held that a federal statute prohibiting the
transportation of an unregistered sawed-off shotgun in interstate
commerce was not in violation of the second amendment.100
Noting that the amendment was aimed at the preservation of a
militia, the Court failed to find that the weapon involved in the
case bore any "reasonable relationship to the preservation or
efficiency of a well regulated militia," and was thus not within the
ambit of constitutional protection."0 ' The Court did not further
explain what it meant by "reasonable relationship." Certainly
machine guns, recoilless rifles and mortars would prove quite
useful for the efficiency of a military body, as would rifles,
shotguns and handguns. This oversimplification was noted in a
federal circuit court opinion 2 three years later which pointed out
that the view of the Supreme Court was outdated, since it had been
recognized that the federal government could and had regulated
such weapons as machine guns, customized longguns and the like.
Refusing to formulate any general rule itself, the court advocated
the use of an ad hoc approach to determine whether the weapon
involved was such as might be deemed suitable for militia use.'
Unfortunately, this court also failed to set down any more definite
guidelines for the future.
United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
I01 d. at 178. The Court observed, "'Certainly it is not within judicial notice that this
weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment or that its use could contribute to the
common defense." Id. A real difficulty with the "reasonable relationship" test, as the First
Circuit, in Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 922 (Ist Cir. 1942), pointed out, is that
certain weapons which have a recognized military value in the hands of an individual citizen,
are', or should be, subject to regulation. This is especially true of the handgun. See Ex parte
Thomas, 21 Okla. 770, 97 P. 260 (1908).
1D- Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916 (Ist Cir. 1942). The court stated that in light of
the fact that almost any lethal weapon had some military value, "to hold that the Second
Amendment limits the federal government to regulations concerning only weapons which can
be classed as antiques or curiosities,--almost any other might bear some reasonable
relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia unit of the present
day,-is in effect to hold that the limitation of the Second Amendment is absolute. . . .It
seems to us unlikely that the framers of the Amendment intended any such result." Id. at
922. See also Sprecher, supra note 8, at 665-66.
11 Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 922 (ist Cir. 1942).
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CONCLUSIONS
Haynes v. United States,104 while invalidating the existing
firearms registration scheme of Congress, suggested that a
registration requirement, properly drawn, could avoid constitutional
objections raised by the fifth amendment.10 Review of the
decisional interpretations of the second amendment reveals a
clouded uncertainty as to both the object of the provision's
protection and the subject of its limitations. While courts are
certain that the second amendment protects the collective right of a
"political" body-"the people""'-there does not appear to be
any concise authority determining the relationship of this right to
considerations of federalism. It is possible either to view the second
amendment as prohibiting the states from interfering with the right
of the federal government to draw upon a well-trained militia or
as prohibiting the federal government from obstructing similar
activities by the states. Until this question is settled, the full extent
of congressional power to regulate firearms cannot be determined.
In spite of this doubt, however, the position that the second
amendment applies only to weapons suitable for militia use 0 7
indicates that Congress has at least one guideline for determining
the constitutional validity of various regulatory schemes.
t' 390 U.S. 85 (1968).
' Id. at 96-101.
"' See cases cited at note 69 supra.
10, See notes 96-103 supra and accompanying text.
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